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ABSTRACT 
 Research on juror decision-making has been vast.  Research on plea-bargaining, in 
contrast, has been scarce.  This fact runs in opposition to the reality that less than 10% of 
cases in most jurisdictions ever make it to trial.  Typically, plea-negotiations rather than 
jurors determine the outcome of cases.  The present research examines the willingness of 
people to accept plea-bargains when guilty or innocent.  All participants were paired with a 
confederate-participant.  Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the guilty 
condition and the other half were in the innocent condition.  Those in the guilty condition 
were induced by the confederate-participant to cheat on a problem that was supposed to be 
solved individually.  All participants (whether guilty or innocent) were then accused of 
having cheated on one of the problems.  Participants were then told that they could choose to 
sign a statement agreeing to work in the research lab for 20 hours (the plea deal) or risk a 
charge of academic dishonesty.  Although guilty participants were expected to accept the 
plea more often than innocent participants, individual differences were expected to moderate 
the magnitude of this effect.  The plea acceptance results confirmed the hypotheses—guilty 
people accepted the plea deal at a rate of 79%, which was significantly more often than 
innocent individuals.  More importantly, innocent participants were still willing to accept the 
plea agreement at a significant rate of 52%.  Among the innocent, belief in a just world had 
no moderating effects on the rate of plea acceptance.  Among the guilty however, those with 
stronger endorsement of belief in a just world were significantly more likely to accept the 
plea than those weaker in belief in a just world.  Individuals with higher perceived 
intelligence and ACT scores were generally more likely to reject the plea than those who 
scored lower on these measures, but only among the innocent.   
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 1997, Charles E. Harris Sr. was caught in possession of rock cocaine and a stolen 
handgun.  Unfortunately, two Los Angeles police officers had planted both the cocaine and 
the handgun in Harris’ car.  The State offered Harris a three-year prison sentence in exchange 
for his acceptance of a plea conviction—if Harris rejected the deal and pursued a trial, the 
resulting sentence would likely be five times that.  Harris would later say that fear ultimately 
drove him to accept the plea deal—fear that a jury would believe the officers’ testimony over 
his own and convict him.  After 19 months in prison, Harris’ conviction became one of 
dozens to be overturned in connection to the Rampart scandal.  Since the exposure of this 
scandal, several police officers in Los Angeles have resigned or been fired after being 
implicated in delinquent behaviors—the most frequent misconduct involved the fabrication 
of evidence, which occurred in at least 32 criminal cases (Williams, 2001; Kaplan, 2009).  
Twenty-five of those 32 cases were settled in plea negotiations (Covey, 2011).  In other 
words, twenty-five innocent defendants, just like Charles E. Harris Sr., were framed by 
police officers and yet accepted plea deals despite their innocence. 
 Legal decisions are primarily settled during plea negotiations and are rarely tried in a 
courtroom.  In a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
majority “… the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials” (Lafler v. Cooper, pg. 11).  Over 95% of all criminal cases in the 50 states 
are settled in plea negotiations and are never brought to trial (Ross, 2006).  In 2002, 95% of 
state court felony convictions were the result of guilty pleas whereas only 2% were the result 
of jury trials (Burke, 2007).  It is important to note that plea deals have not always been such 
a dominating factor in criminal convictions.  These numbers represent a growing trend since 
  
	  
2 
the 1980s, which coincides with a national movement toward imposing more severe 
maximum prison sentences.  As maximum sentences intensify so too do the pressures to plea 
as a way of minimizing those sentences.  According to a senior judge from the United States 
District Court in Denver, the ratio of guilty pleas to criminal trial verdicts in 1977 was a little 
more than four to one—last year, it had grown to almost 32 to one (Oppel, 2011).  
Research on juror decision-making has been vast and varied—A PsycINFO search 
including the keywords jury, juries, or juror produces well over 3,000 results.  In contrast, 
there exists a dearth of literature on plea negotiations, and none have examined plea 
behaviors using experimental methods.  Instead, most of the existing literature on plea-
bargaining has been limited to academic discussion in law reviews (Bar-Gill & Gazal Ayal, 
2006; Ross, 2006), or survey studies measuring the prevalence of pleas in samples of the 
previously convicted (Ball, 2006; Piehl & Bushway, 2007).  This uneven representation in 
the literature is further exacerbated by the reality that plea negotiations affect nearly twenty 
times the number of cases that jurors do.  Plea-bargaining is becoming more and more 
integral to the American criminal justice system, and future efforts must be directed at 
matching its representation in the research arena. 
The “Innocent” Plea 
 Approximately 95% of convictions in the United States are the result of plea 
negotiations (Burke, 2007; Ross, 2006).  This overwhelming proportion has led some 
scholars to doubt the validity of this bargaining system, and question whether it encourages 
innocent as well as guilty suspects to accept plea negotiations (Gazal-Ayal, 2006).  But why 
would the innocent accept plea bargains for crimes they did not commit?  
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A plea deal, by definition, requires the explicit assurance that the defendant is 
receiving some sort of discount.  This plea discount has also been referred to as the trial 
penalty, and is theoretically meant to reflect the resources saved by the State from avoiding 
lengthy trial proceedings.  Unfortunately, the trial penalty often seems to vastly outweigh 
what could be reasonably deemed the cost of trial procedures.  In the Rampart scandal, 
defendants convicted at trial suffered punishments five times harsher than those who agreed 
to plea deals; in another scandal in Tulia, TX, trial sentences were thirteen times harsher 
(Covey, 2011).  These two examples illustrate the magnitude of the trial penalty, which can 
quickly turn eighteen months in prison to eight years.  Even an innocent person must fear the 
threat of eight years in prison when offered a plea deal assuring them eighteen months 
instead.   
Quantity is not the only factor that can be manipulated in plea negotiations.  The 
accused may also accept pleas in order to avoid the risk of an immeasurably worse 
punishment at trial.  For instance, Henry Alford was indicted on a charge for first-degree 
murder in 1963.  He was charged in North Carolina, which, at the time, enforced a death 
penalty by default in convictions of first-degree murder by trial.  His only guaranteed 
assurance against the death penalty was to accept a plea deal—otherwise, he ran the risk of 
being convicted by a jury and executed.  He pled guilty to second-degree murder consistent 
with the advice of his counsel, and waived his right to a trial.  Even after his plea, however, 
Alford maintained his innocence.  He later attempted to appeal his conviction claiming that 
his plea was only the product of the misleading advice of his attorney, and the fear and 
coercion he felt due to the overwhelming threat of capital punishment.  After several appeals, 
the Supreme Court eventually took the case and ruled that the plea should be accepted 
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because it had indeed been entered in knowingly and voluntarily (North Carolina v. Alford, 
1970).  Pleas in which defendants accept the bargain while maintaining their innocence are 
now known as Alford or West pleas (Williams, 2001).  Another type of plea known as a nolo 
contendere plea involves accepting a plea deal without admitting guilt or claiming to be 
innocent (Bar-Gill & Gazal Ayal, 2006).  
Both the Alford and nolo contendere plea have the same effect as a plea with an 
admission of guilt.  The pleas involve the same waiver of rights and restrictions on appeal.  
The caveat is that the defendant does not admit guilt for the crime for which they accept 
punishment.   In fact, the defendant could even insist upon his or her own innocence while 
accepting punishment.  The existence of these two types of pleas illustrates the questionable 
effect of the plea bargain on the American judicial system.  The American judicial system 
has been criticized and lauded for its adversarial nature—the State is burdened with the task 
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt despite the Defense’s best arguments.  How could 
such a system manufacture cases in which the State can convict individuals who do not admit 
guilt without proving their guilt?  Questions such as these currently inspire the continued 
debate regarding the value of plea bargains and negotiations (e.g., Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, 
2009; Gazal-Ayal, 2006; Kipnis, 2001; Rufo, 2009). 
You Have the Right to Waive Your Rights 
 It is important to note that by agreeing to a plea bargain, suspects effectively waive 
several of their constitutional rights.  The extent of the waiver and precisely which rights are 
waived vary by jurisdiction, but the list of rights typically affected include: the right to plead 
not guilty and persist in that plea, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to a trial by 
jury, the right to confront accusers, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to testify 
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or present evidence on one’s own behalf.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is considered by most federal courts to provide the protocol necessary to satisfy 
the constitutional requirements of due process and voluntariness associated with plea 
bargains and the waiver of one’s rights (Pan & Kaiser, 2003).  In order for a plea bargain to 
be constitutionally sound (according to Rule 11), defendants must be aware of all the 
elements of the crime for which they are pleading guilty, competent at the time of the plea, 
and enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily.  This rule does not require, however, that 
defendants be warned or notified of all the constitutional rights forfeited by their guilty plea 
(Pan & Kaiser, 2003). 
 Although a prosecution attorney must be present in order for plea negotiations to take 
place as a representative of the State, a defense attorney need not be present to represent the 
defendant’s case (Pan & Kaiser, 2003).  Defendants can choose to waive their rights to an 
attorney and instead continue procedures pro se (on their own behalf).  Although it is 
difficult to ascertain precisely how often the accused waive their rights to an attorney, 
research on the waiver of Miranda rights can provide some insight. 
 Research on Miranda warnings found that 78% of custodial suspects waived their 
Miranda rights and subjected themselves to questioning or interrogation.  Of those 
subsequently questioned, 64% made self-incriminating statements, full confessions, or 
admissions of guilt (Leo, 1996).  Additionally, in a sample of 152 defendants aged 11-17, 
only 9.7% of all defendants questioned by the police requested an attorney, and those aged 
15 and younger were even more likely to confess and waive their right to counsel (Viljoen, 
Klaver, & Roesch, 2005).  Many of these waivers seem to result from a lack of 
comprehension of their Miranda rights, or misunderstanding the importance and impact of 
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these rights (Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, Swell, & Hazelwood, 2007; Rogers, Hazelwood, 
Swell, Harrison, & Shuman, 2008).  Kassin and Norwick (2004) examined the waiver of 
Miranda rights empirically and found that innocent participants were more likely to waive 
their rights than guilty participants primarily because they felt their innocence would protect 
them.  It is important to note that the waiver of one’s Miranda rights includes waiving the 
right to consult an attorney—which could enable the State to pursue plea negotiations 
directly with the suspect (in some jurisdictions).  Although suspects can reinstate their rights 
at any time, it is reasonable to assume, given how few maintain their rights initially, that 
many suspects never do.  This means that plea negotiations can easily take place without an 
attorney to represent the accused.  Without an attorney present, plea negotiations would seem 
to resemble interviewing or interrogation scenarios in which a suspect is pressured to 
confess—the critical difference being that rather than a confession, prosecutors want a plea 
deal. 
False Confessions 
 A review of forensic DNA exonerations has revealed that false confessions have been 
an important factor in wrongful convictions—present in at least 15% of cases (Scheck, 
Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000).  Unfortunately, no such statistics exist for the prevalence of 
innocent plea acceptance.  The Innocence Project provides the majority of presently 
available statistics describing factors that contribute to wrongful convictions.  Unfortunately, 
this makes statistics on innocent plea acceptance largely unavailable for two reasons.  The 
first and primary reason is that the Innocence Project can only intervene in cases on post-
conviction appeal—the opportunity for those who have accepted plea deals to appeal are rare 
or non-existent.  Second, the Innocence Project aggregates those who have accepted plea 
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deals with those who have made other self-incriminating statements (like false confessions).  
Thus, there are unfortunately no easily interpretable statistics available illustrating the 
prevalence of innocent plea acceptance in the real world.   
Given the substantial percent of individuals that falsely confess to crimes, however, it 
would seem reasonable to assume that many may also falsely accept plea bargains.  A false 
confession would seem to require many of the same elements as a false plea acceptance.  In 
fact, Russano, Meissner, Narchet, and Kassin (2005) went so far as to even refer to one of 
their confession manipulations as the “deal” technique.  In this condition, participants were 
told that if they agreed to sign the confession then, “… things could probably be settled 
pretty quickly” (p. 483).  This manipulation did increase the rate of false confession from 6% 
to 14%.  However, this manipulation and its desired outcome are qualitatively different than 
those in the current research.  An implied deal of settling things quickly in order to elicit a 
confession is qualitatively different than an explicit deal offered as a settlement.   
A false confession is not synonymous with innocent plea acceptance for a number of 
reasons.  First, due to the existence of the Alford (or West) plea and nolo contendere plea, the 
acceptance of a plea negotiation does not require a confession of guilt (in most jurisdictions).  
Second, despite the intimations of leniency illegally embedded in the confession techniques 
of some investigators, the process inherently involves high levels of ambiguity—this 
ambiguity is greatly driven by the fact that investigators have no ultimate authority to assign 
punishment to suspects.  A plea agreement, in contrast, cannot present even the slightest 
amount of mystery.  A defendant who signs a plea agreement should be well informed by a 
prosecution attorney regarding the consequences and potential benefits of that agreement in 
order to fulfill rights to due process.   
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Third, unlike confessions, plea-bargaining does not typically occur under stressful 
interrogation situations.  Plea decisions can therefore typically be made more deliberatively 
than decisions related to confessions.  Research on decision-making has illustrated some 
interesting biases that might extend to plea-bargaining situations.  For instance, if given the 
option, people generally prefer to eliminate the risk of consequences entirely rather than 
settle for a risk reduction—even when eliminating the risk entirely is more costly, which is 
known as the certainty effect (Plous 1993).  This finding ties in well to the typical options 
provided to people in plea negotiation situations.  One option represents a certain negative 
outcome whereas the other option possesses an uncertain possibility of an even more 
negative outcome.   
Unfortunately, the decision-making literature does not provide precise predictions 
regarding plea-bargaining behaviors.  In most of the decision-making literature, participants 
are provided with clear options that are measured with a common denominator—typically 
money, and the probabilities of the uncertain outcome are explicitly articulated.  Thus, 
comparisons regarding the magnitude of each option are relatively simple.  In plea situations, 
the two options often have qualitatively and quantitatively different aspects rendering 
interpretations of magnitude or severity fairly subjective.  For instance, in a situation for 
which a suspect is offered a plea deal entailing hours of community service in order to avoid 
possible jail time, the magnitude of one loss versus the other would be difficult to calculate.  
Moreover, in a decision making study the chances of the uncertain outcome (.e.g., 50% 
chance to lose $50 and 50% chance to lose nothing), leave no room for ambiguity regarding 
the explicit probabilties. Nevertheless, plea negotiations more closely resemble the kind of 
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deliberative task that characterizes the judgment and decision making literature than do 
confessions.  
Fourth, and arguably most critical from a psychological perspective, the underlying 
processes driving an innocent person to falsely confess could be qualitatively different from 
those that would drive an innocent person to accept a plea agreement.  Researchers have 
posited that false confessions can often result from innocent individuals mistakenly believing 
their innocence will protect them—the phenomenology of innocence  (Kassin, 2005).  If the 
phenomenology of innocence causes individuals to view their innocence as a shield that even 
a false confession cannot penetrate, why would these individuals agree to a plea deal?  A plea 
deal would be enticing only to those who felt they were at risk of being convicted at trial.  If 
those that falsely confess truly abide by the phenomenology of innocence, they should not 
fear a conviction at trial, which should reduce their motivation to accept a plea agreement.  It 
is quite possible, if one accepts the phenomenology of innocence as a likely contributor to 
false confession, that populations vulnerable to falsely confess could be quite distinct from 
those accepting pleas under some circumstances.  Given these critical differences, it is 
important that research specific to plea negotiation contexts begins to propagate. 
Individual Differences & Plea-Bargaining 
Research has revealed that certain individual characteristics increase vulnerability to 
falsely confessing.  Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004) outlined a number of possible personal 
risk factors that could predispose one to making a false confession.  These factors included 
suggestibility, compliance, youth, anxiety, mental retardation, etc.  By further exploring these 
factors, research can determine whether these traits extend beyond the interrogation to the 
negotiation.  Exploring other individual differences can also begin to elucidate whether some 
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traits that would put one at risk of false confession could act as a deterrent to innocent plea 
acceptance.    
One of the presumptions behind plea bargaining is that the defendant’s decision to 
accept or reject the plea is closely related to whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of the 
charge. Accordingly, an important measure is the difference in plea acceptance rates between 
the innocent and guilty. One way to express this is the diagnosticity ratio, which is the ratio 
of the percentage of guilty accepting a plea to the percentage of innocent accepting a plea. 
The idea of diagnosticity provides a context for examining individual difference variables. 
Are there points along any given individual difference variable in which plea bargaining 
outcomes represent a more or less diagnostic measure of actual guilt?  All of the subsequent 
literature and predictions regarding individual differences are framed in reference to the 
capacity of each individual difference variable as a moderator of plea outcome diagnosticity.    
Belief in a Just World 
 Belief in a just world refers to a cognition in which people believe in a broad sense of 
justice such that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner, 1965).  
Since its first appearance in the literature, belief in a just world has evolved from a general 
tendency that everyone possesses to an individual difference variable that people endorse to 
varying degrees.  In its evolution, belief in a just world has been examined in a number of 
different studies utilizing a variety of different scales (see Hafer & Begue, 2005 for a 
review), and has been shown to correlate consistently with other related personality measures 
(Wolfradt & Dalbert, 2003).   
  Whereas much of the research on the behavioral implications of belief in a just world 
has focused on behaviors that are negative in nature, such as victim blaming; more recently, a 
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growing literature has examined its more positive effects (Hafer & Begue, 2005).  For 
instance, strong belief in a just world has been found to buffer one against anger or 
aggressive behavior such as road rage (Nesbit & Blankenship, under review).  Other research 
has shown that those strong in belief in a just world endorsement are more forgiving (Strelan, 
2007).  Additional research has shown that belief in a just world can have mitigating effects 
on stress and coping such that those with strong beliefs in a just world are able to assess 
stressful situations as challenges rather than threats (Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994).  Further, 
those who believe in a just world tend to have a brighter outlook on the future and report 
having more faith in other people (Dalbert, 2009).  Stronger beliefs in a just world have also 
been positively correlated with trust in societal institutions (Correia & Vala, 2004).  These 
findings seem to lend support to the idea that those who strongly endorse belief in a just 
world may be better equipped to handle the stress and ambiguity of a plea negotiation 
situation. 
Based on this research, I predicted that people who strongly endorse belief in a just 
world would act in accordance with their actual guilt or innocence.  In other words, as belief 
in a just world increases, the probability increases that the innocent will reject the plea and 
the guilty will accept the plea.  Essentially, those who believe in a just world will be 
motivated to act in a way that preserves ultimate justice—the guilty should accept 
punishment for wrongdoing (to avoid a worse punishment in the future) and the innocent 
should avoid unfair punishment for a crime they did not commit.  As a result, the 
diagnosticity of plea acceptance outcomes will be higher in those with stronger endorsement 
of belief in a just world compared to those with weaker endorsements.   
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Self-esteem 
 Self-esteem has been found to have behavioral effects in numerous contexts.  For 
instance, in the health psychology literature, researchers found that individuals with high 
self-esteem who engage in risky behaviors are more likely to justify these actions with 
irrational cognitions in order to align their positive self-views with their behaviors (Gerrard, 
Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Russell, 2000).  This additionally makes their views of perceived 
vulnerability lower.  Further, individuals with high self-esteem act more defensively to 
information that may threaten their positive self-views and lower their perceived 
vulnerability (Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999).  Other research has shown that 
individuals with high self-esteem act less tentatively in new social environments and express 
less fear of rejection or failure than those with low self-esteem (Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 
2007). 
 I predicted that those who reported higher levels of self-esteem would generally show 
greater reluctance to accept a plea.  The role of self-esteem in reducing pleas was expected to 
be stronger for the guilty than for the innocent.  High self-esteem individuals would be 
reluctant to associate something negative (i.e., cheating) with their positive self-view, and 
would be less fearful of the risks of rejecting the plea negotiation.  Further, high self-esteem 
individuals who were guilty would behave more defensively than those who were not guilty 
and would therefore, be more affected by the cheating accusation.  This defensiveness would 
result in fewer pleas among the guilty due to their unwillingness to label their behaviors 
negatively.  This is analogous to high self-esteem individuals who engage in risky behaviors 
being most likely to justify their actions irrationally in order to align their behaviors with 
their positive self-views (Gerrard et al., 2000).  In effect, the diagnosticity of plea acceptance 
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outcomes will be higher in those with lower levels of reported self-esteem compared to those 
with higher levels.   
Psychological Entitlement 
 Psychological entitlement is a relatively new construct, which examines people’s 
sense of deservingness (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004).  
Psychological entitlement is thought to pervade all situations and is considered a stable trait 
characterized by a consistent feeling of entitlement across situations.  Initially, psychological 
entitlement was limited to its role as one of the seven factors of narcissism as measured by 
the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988).  More recently, however, 
entitlement has been found to be distinct from measures of self-esteem due to its focus on 
deservingness and worth above others (rather than a focus on self-worth; Campbell et al., 
2004; Lessard, Greenberger, Chen, & Farruggia, 2010).   
Few studies have examined psychological entitlement as its own construct (separate 
from narcissism) and its behavioral implications.  However, given the definition of 
psychological entitlement and its correlates with narcissism, I predicted that individuals with 
higher senses of psychological entitlement would be generally less willing than those with a 
lower sense of entitlement to accept a plea agreement.  The role of psychological entitlement 
in reducing pleas was expected to be stronger for the guilty than for the innocent.  Previous 
research on psychological entitlement versus self-esteem has shown that individuals high in 
psychological entitlement act similarly to high self-esteem individuals, but to a more extreme 
degree.  Thus, psychological entitlement was expected to have a negative effect on the 
diagnosticity of plea outcomes such that those with higher psychological entitlement would 
exhibit lower levels of diagnosticity.   
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The Big Five 
The validity of the five-factor model of personality is well established (John, 
Naumann, & Soto, 2008; McCrae & Costa, 1987; McCrae & Costa, 1997).  The five factors 
of personality are best known as:  neuroticism (emotional instability), agreeableness 
(likeability), openness (intellect), extraversion, and conscientiousness.  Together, the five 
factors have been examined in several behavioral domains such as moral behaviors 
(Lonnqvist et al., 2011) and risk preferences (Soane & Chmiel, 2005).  Under the five-factor 
model, all personality traits can be incorporated by five overarching factors or traits.  Due to 
the complexity and interrelations among the Big Five, I limited my predictions specifically to 
two of the five traits. 
Neuroticism.  Research has shown that neurotic individuals tend to be more risk 
averse especially when something meaningful is at stake (Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, & 
Walkowitz, 2011).  Neurotic individuals also tend to worry more, demonstrate stronger 
pessimistic tendencies (Tamir, 2005), and are more emotionally unstable.     
I predicted that individuals who reported higher levels of neuroticism would be 
generally more willing to accept pleas.  The role of neuroticism in increasing pleas was 
expected to be stronger for the innocent than for the guilty.  The pessimistic tendencies of 
neurotic individuals would be accentuated more in the innocent condition given their 
elevated aversion to the risk of wrongful conviction as compared to those lower in 
neuroticism.  The innocent that were high in neuroticism would view the punishment of 
working in the lab as “fitting” to their personas due to their propensity for more negative 
states (Tamir, 2005).  Thus, the diagnosticity of plea negotiation outcomes would be lower in 
those with high neuroticism as compared to those with lower neuroticism.   
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Agreeableness.  Some researchers have postulated that people who are more 
acquiescent in social situations are more vulnerable to falsely confessing to a crime (Kassin 
& Gudjonsson, 2004).  This prediction could also extend to plea negotiations.  The most 
theoretically relevant trait in testing this theory is agreeableness, which is characterized by 
several pro-social behaviors including: flexibility, tolerance, cooperativeness, and trust 
(Barry & Friedman, 1998).  Research on agreeableness has shown that agreeable people tend 
to be more consistent in their risk preference decisions and are typically inclined toward risk 
aversion (Soane & Chmiel, 2005).  Agreeableness can be a liability in competitive 
negotiation situations (e.g., bartering as a buyer or seller)—highly agreeable individuals can 
be anchored by earlier offers such that their willingness to please will cause them to lose 
ground while bargaining (Barry & Friedman, 1998).  Agreeableness has also been shown to 
affect the way older adults make health-decisions such that those high in agreeableness will 
be less likely to actively participate in their treatments, and will instead defer to their doctors 
(Flynn & Smith, 2007).  Further, agreeable individuals exhibit strong tendencies toward 
compromise in situations of conflict (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001).   
Together, these findings lend support to the idea that agreeable individuals are 
strongly motivated toward pro-social goals such as compromise and cooperativeness.  Thus, I 
predicted that more agreeable individuals would be generally more willing to accept pleas.  
The role of agreeableness in increasing pleas was expected to be stronger for the innocent 
than for the guilty.  The cooperative tendencies of agreeable individuals would be 
accentuated more in the innocent condition, which involved more evident conflict between 
the accusations of the experimenter and the actions of the participant.  Thus, the diagnosticity 
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of plea negotiation outcomes would be lower in those with high agreeableness as compared 
to those with lower agreeableness.   
Manipulating Guilt and Innocence 
Several developments in confession research provide the stepping stones for future 
plea bargaining research  (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985).  Most importantly, confession 
research has successfully designed paradigms in which the behaviors of the “accused” can be 
observed experimentally.  More specifically, confession paradigms have evolved methods to 
present credible accusations against research participants.  
 The first of such paradigms to appear in the literature is known as the “ALT” key 
paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996).  In this paradigm, participants are asked to complete a 
task examining reaction time.  They are further instructed not to press the “ALT” key, which, 
if pressed, would cause the computer program to crash.  After participants are engaged in the 
task for a certain amount of time, the program crashes automatically.  All participants are 
then accused of pushing the “ALT” key and crashing the computer though none actually did.  
In the original study, 69% of participants falsely confessed to having crashed the computer, 
and 9% even confabulated memory details of having pressed the forbidden “ALT” key.  
Interestingly, when this paradigm was replicated with young adults aged 11-17, a similar 
proportion of participants agreed to sign the confession despite being told that a confession 
would result in their obligation to work in the lab for 10 hours to recode data lost in the crash 
(Viljoen et al., 2005).  Although this paradigm provided a valuable first look into the 
behaviors of the accused, it has two major limitations.  The first is that all participants in this 
paradigm are innocent—the important manipulation of guilt and innocence was not fully 
developed.  Second, the “crime” for which participants are accused is so commonplace that 
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participants could easily and falsely conceive of having hit the “ALT” key during the 
experiment accidentally. 
 Russano et al. (2005) developed a second paradigm in response to these criticisms.  In 
this paradigm, subjects are told that they are participating in a study interested in examining 
both individual and team problem solving.  All participants are paired with a confederate, and 
are given explicit instructions that the team problems are to be solved in pairs but that the 
individual problems are to be solved independently.  Some participants are then induced to 
“help” the confederate with an individual problem (guilty condition), whereas others are not 
(innocent condition).  All participants are then accused of having cheated on one of the 
individual problems.  This new cheating paradigm circumvented the two major limitations of 
the “ALT” key paradigm discussed previously.  First, the study includes both true 
accusations against the guilty and false accusations against the innocent—guilt and 
innocence was directly manipulated.  Second, unlike the “ALT” key accusation, participants 
should be cognizant of whether they actually did or did not help the confederate.  The “ALT” 
key and cheating paradigms provide an excellent template for experimental research on plea-
bargaining behaviors.   
The Current Research 
 The current research examined participants’ willingness to accept a plea bargain after 
being accused of cheating on a problem-solving task.  Half of the participants were induced 
to cheat and half were not, yet both were pressured to accept a plea bargain for the crime 
regardless of guilt.  Given the overwhelming percentage of real-life cases resolved through 
plea negotiations, I hypothesized that even the innocent would accept plea bargains.  Guilty 
participants were, of course, expected to accept the plea more often than innocent 
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participants, but individual differences were expected to moderate the magnitude of these 
effects. 
Several hypotheses were generated about the role that individual differences may play 
in plea acceptance rates.  Of particular interest is the way in which these individual 
differences were expected to moderate the diagnosticity of plea outcomes—the plea-guilt 
relationship.  All the subsequent predictions posit an interaction between the individual 
difference variable and guilt-innocence.  I predicted that people with strong endorsement of 
belief in a just world would exhibit a higher plea outcome diagnosticity value than those with 
weak endorsement of belief in a just world.  Consequently, stronger beliefs in a just world 
would be related with higher plea acceptance when innocent.  Conversely, when guilty, 
stronger beliefs in a just world would be related with lower plea acceptance.  Additionally, I 
predicted that those who reported higher levels of self-esteem or psychological entitlement 
would exhibit lower plea outcome diagnosticity values than those lower in those traits.  
Individuals with higher self-esteem or psychological entitlement were generally expected to 
reject the plea more often relative to those lower in these traits.  The effects of self-esteem 
and psychological entitlement were expected to be higher among the guilty than the innocent 
owing to the perceived self-threat discussed earlier.  I also hypothesized that more neurotic 
individuals would exhibit lower plea outcome diagnosticity values.  Individuals who are 
highly neurotic were generally expected to accept the plea deal more often than those less 
neurotic.  The effects of neuroticism were expected to be higher among the innocent than the 
guilty due to the propensity of highly neurotic individuals toward expecting negative 
outcomes.  Highly agreeable individuals were also expected to show lower plea outcome 
diagnosticity values than those who were less agreeable.  Individuals who are highly 
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agreeable were largely expected to accept the plea deal more often than those less agreeable 
although this effect was expected to be higher among the innocent than the guilty.  These 
effects were expected because highly agreeable individuals tend to endorse pro-social 
behaviors.     
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CHAPTER 2.  METHODS 
Participants 
 One hundred and sixty-five undergraduate students enrolled in introductory courses at 
Iowa State University participated in this experiment in exchange for course research credit 
(97 females and 68 males).  The participants averaged 19 years of age with a range of 18-45 
years.  All participants were treated according to American Psychological Association (APA) 
ethical guidelines. 
Materials  
 Global Belief in a Just World Scale.  The Global Belief in a Just World Scale is a 7-
item scale created to measure people’s endorsement of the belief that in general, people get 
what they deserve (Lipkus, 1991; refer to Appendix A).  Each item was presented with a 6-
point, Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  The scale 
has been scrutinized with a variety of reliability tests, and seems to rate consistently better 
than the original Just World Scale and even the Just World Scale Revised (Hellman, 
Muilenburg-Trevino, & Worley, 2008).  In the last decade, the homogeneity of the belief in a 
just world construct has been debated with much research supporting the existence of both 
personal belief in a just world (one is personally treated fairly) and a general belief in a just 
world (Dalbert, 2009).  Importantly, the Global Belief in a Just World Scale does appear to 
consistently measure individual’s general belief in a just world, which has been found to be 
more predictive in situations that pose external risks (those perceived to be controlled by 
others).  Thus, given a plea negotiation situation in which the defendant is somewhat at the 
mercy of the criminal justice system, it would seem that general belief in a just world would 
be most relevant.   
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 Rosenberg Self-Esteem.  Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
scale (refer to Appendix B; Rosenberg, 1965).  The Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale includes 
10-items measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Sample items include, “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure,” and “I feel that I 
have a number of good qualities”.  This scale has been utilized in a number of studies and 
consistently maintains a Cronbach’s α > .8 (Gerrard et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2004).   
 Psychological Entitlement Scale.  The Psychological Entitlement Scale is a 
relatively new construct created to measure one’s feelings of deservedness and entitlement 
relative to others (Campbell et al., 2004).  The Psychological Entitlement Scale includes 9-
items measured on a Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree; refer to Appendix C).  Since its creation, this scale has proven consistently reliable 
resulting in Cronbach’s  αs > .8 (Campbell et al., 2004; Lessard et al., 2010; Pryor, Miller, & 
Gaughan, 2008).  The Psychological Entitlement Scale is, however, not the only measure of 
entitlement—prior to its invention, most researchers used the entitlement factor in the larger 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory measure.  This scale, however, has been found to be more 
internally reliable (Campbell et al., 2004), and appears to measure the less pathological 
aspects of psychological entitlement (Pryor et al., 2008). 
 Big Five-Aspect Scale.  The five-factor model of personality has been validated by 
numerous researchers in a countless number of studies in various contexts (John, Naumann, 
& Soto, 2008; McCrae & Costa, 1987; McCrae & Costa, 1997).  The five factors of 
personality are best known as:  neuroticism (emotional instability), agreeableness 
(likeability), openness (intellect), extraversion, and conscientiousness.  Together, the five 
factors have been examined in several behavioral domains such as moral behaviors 
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(Lonnqvist et al., 2011) and risk preferences (Soane & Chmiel, 2005).  Under the five-factor 
model, all personality traits can be incorporated by five overarching factors or traits.  Further 
research has focused on examining personality traits on a two-level hierarchy, in which the 
five domains each subsume six narrower facets found on the second level (Costa & McCrae, 
1992).  More recently, researchers posit the existence of a third level on the personality 
hierarchy, an intermediate level thought to include aspects of personality (DeYoung, Quilty, 
& Peterson, 2007).  Each aspect subsumes three different facets and there are two facets for 
each of the Big Five personality traits—this three-level hierarchy of personality has been 
validated through factor analysis (DeYoung et al., 2007).   
The Big Five Aspect Scale is designed to measure the two aspects of personality 
subsumed by each of the five factors (refer to Figure 1).  It includes one hundred items (10 
items for each facet) measured on Likert-type scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree; refer to Appendix E).  Due to the uniqueness of each aspect (confirmed in studies 
using factor analysis), it was important to include aspect-level measurements in the current 
study.  Aspect-level measurements helped to ensure the predicted relationships were not 
concealed due to uneven relationships between plea-bargaining behaviors and each aspect.  
For instance, one could imagine that the withdrawal aspect of neuroticism (which includes 
items about stress and doubt) could be more relevant in plea negotiation contexts than the 
volatility aspect (which includes items about anger and emotional stability).  This also 
allowed analyses to be performed on the highest level of the hierarchy (collapsing the 
aspects) since each aspect is subsumed by a Big Five personality trait.   
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Demographic Information.  Demographic measures were primarily included in 
order to describe the study sample.  Additionally, demographic items served as possible 
control variables to reduce noise in subsequent data analyses.  Items included in the initial 
demographic questionnaire measured:  gender, age, citizenship status, ethnicity, political 
endorsements, and ACT scores.  
Political endorsements were measured with two items and each item was presented 
with its own 7-point Likert-type scale.  The first question relating more specifically to 
political party was, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, or an Independent?”  The scaled response ranged from 1 (Strong Republican) to 7 
(Strong Democrat)—a “neutral” response of 4 indicated a preference of Independent.  The 
second item related more closely to political spectrum, “Which of these opinions best 
represents your views?”.  This scale ranged from 1 (Extremely Liberal) to 4 
(Moderate/Middle of the Road) to 7 (Extremely Conservative).  
 
 
Neurotic 
Volatile Withdrawn 
Agreeable 
Polite Compassionate 
Conscientious 
Orderly Industrious 
Extraverted 
Enthusiastic Assertive 
Open 
Open Intelligent 
Figure 1. Represents the Big Five Aspect model of personality traits with two aspects subsumed by each Big Five 
trait. 
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Procedure 
 The procedure utilized in this study was adapted from the novel experimental 
paradigm created by Russano et al. (2005) to investigate the effects of various interrogation 
procedures on confession behaviors.  The protocol was modified in order to investigate the 
effects of guilt and personality on plea-bargaining behaviors.  Participants were asked to 
accept plea negotiations rather than being pressured to confess after the cheating accusation. 
 All participants were told that the study would be examining individual versus team 
problem solving, and that they would be asked to complete several logic problems both in a 
pair and on their own.  One confederate posing as another participant waited outside the 
laboratory with the real participant.  The experimenter (who was always female) greeted both 
of them and asked them into the lab.  After providing informed consent, the experimenter 
provided both the participant and confederate with a packet of questionnaires including the 
belief in a just world, self-esteem, and psychological entitlement measures, and demographic 
questions (refer to Appendices A-D, respectively).  Once the questionnaires were complete, 
the confederate and participant were allowed five minutes for a rapport building session 
under the guise that being familiar with one another would help to create a more accurate 
team problem-solving situation.  In actuality, the rapport helped to ensure that participants 
asked to cheat would be more willing to do so due to their sense of familiarity with the 
confederate. 
 After the rapport session, the experimenter returned with two packets of individual 
logic problems (refer to Appendix F) for both the participant and the confederate, and one 
packet of team logic problems (refer to Appendix G).  Each packet contained two problems, 
and the participant and confederate were instructed to rotate individual and team problems 
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such that every other problem was an individual problem then a team problem.  Participants 
were clearly instructed that they were to work together on the team problems only, and that 
the individual problems were to be done alone.  Once participants were cognizant of the 
instructions, experimenters left the room while the problems were solved.  Participants 
randomly assigned to the guilty condition (by a die roll) were induced to cheat by the 
confederate on the second individual problem (the triangle problem).  The confederate 
claimed that he or she was finding the problem difficult and would like to know what answer 
the participant came up with.  The confederates never asked the participants in the innocent 
condition for help. 
 When the problem-solving portion of the experiment concluded, the experimenter re-
entered the lab and collected the problem-solving packets from the confederate and the 
participant.  The experimenter then provided the participant and confederate with the Big 
Five Aspects Scale under the guise that the researchers were also interested in how different 
personalities interacted in team problem-solving situations (refer to Appendix E for Big Five 
Aspects Scale).   
Once the personality questionnaires were filled out, the experimenter returned stating 
that she encountered an issue while scoring the logic problems, and that she needed to speak 
with each of the participants separately.  The experimenter asked the confederate to exit the 
room with her and asked the real participant to wait.  Three minutes later, the experimenter 
returned with the confederate and asked the real participant to follow her to a separate room. 
The experimenter was always blind to guilt-innocence.  Once the experimenter and 
participant had sat down in the separate room, the experimenter explained that the participant 
and the confederate had the same wrong answer for one of the individual problem-solving 
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problems.  She explained that such a match is statistically improbable unless the two shared 
answers on that problem, which would be a violation of study instructions.  
The experimenter further informed participants that the professor in charge of the 
study had been contacted in order to determine how the situation should best be handled.  
The participants were told that the professor was clearly annoyed and upset by the situation, 
and that other people may need to be informed.  The experimenter then revealed that the 
situation could fall under what could be considered cheating or academic dishonesty.  Once 
the severity of the situation had been fully elucidated, the experimenters explained that the 
professor understood that many participants lacked an appreciation for the importance of 
research.  Nonetheless, the experimenter explained that the professor still wanted the 
situation to be documented or remedied in some way.  In order to ensure the participant fully 
comprehended the nature and impact of cheating, the professor requested that s/he be asked 
to work in the research lab for 20 hours over the course of four weeks. 
Participants were then presented with two options: 
Option 1: You can sign this handwritten statement that affirms your agreement to 
work in our lab for 20 hours over the next four weeks, which will result in the 
dropping of this accusation. 
 
Option 2: You can refuse to sign the statement, and face a possible charge of 
academic dishonesty through the Dean of Students Office.   
The experimenter then composed a handwritten statement for the participant to sign 
acknowledging their acceptance of the agreement.  The statement said, “I agree to work 20 
hours on the Problem Solving with Personality study by (one month after that day’s date).”  
If the participant did not sign the statement, the experimenter repeated the request up to two 
more times.  The first request emphasized that the deal may be in their best interest due to the 
possibility of the greater charge of academic dishonesty.  In the second request experimenters 
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expressed their fear that the participant may be making a mistake and reiterated their 
suggestion to sign.  If the participants still refused to sign the statement after three attempts, 
the experimenter ceased requests.  The experimenter then exited the room under the guise 
that the professor needed to be re-contacted regarding the outcome of the situation.   
Once the experimenter returned, she informed the participant that the professor would 
like her or him to complete the final questionnaire for the study.  Participants were then 
administered a questionnaire assessing their perceptions and experiences regarding their 
partner and the experimenter (refer to Appendix H).  Once that questionnaire was completed, 
participants were administered a funnel debriefing in which they were gradually probed for 
suspicion while all the deception in the study was progressively explained.  During the 
debriefing, participants were asked additional post-manipulation questions about their 
experience regarding the cheating accusation (refer to Appendix I for debriefing questions).  
These questions included measures of the participants’ willingness to accept the plea deal, 
perceived likelihood of punishment, strength and plausibility of the evidence against them, 
anxiety, fear, and relief after finding out the accusation was false.  Participants were told that 
the professor provided these additional questions to the experimenter in order to gain a more-
informed understanding of the situation.  The last two questionnaires assessing participants 
perceptions of the confederate, experimenter, and accusation were adapted from Guyll, 
Madon, Yang, Scherr, Lannin, Smalarz, Wells, and Greathouse (unpublished manuscript).  
All participants were referred to counseling services after the debriefing.   
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CHAPTER 3.  RESULTS 
 Twenty-three of the 165 participants (13.9%) tested were removed from the 
subsequent data analyses.  Of these, eight people were removed due to suspicion.  
Participants removed due to suspicion accurately described one of two possible elimination 
criteria prior to debriefing.  The criteria included: 1) any participants who accurately reported 
that the confederate-participant had been in on the study and/or 2) participants that described 
the study’s purpose as examining how people would react to an accusation and subsequent 
deal.  An additional five people in the guilty condition had to be excluded because they 
refused to provide the confederate with their answer, thereby making them innocent despite 
their assignment to the guilty condition.  Four other people were excluded due to early 
suspension of the study given their evident emotional distress during the accusation process.  
The remaining six people were excluded due to: lab experience (2), non-native English 
speaker (2), study experience (1), and experimenter error (1).    
Plea Outcomes 
The leading purpose of this research was to test two primary hypotheses concerning 
plea rates among the guilty and innocent.  All inferential analyses used an alpha level of .05 
and effect sizes are reported using Cohen’s d.  First, and most critically, it was hypothesized 
that a notable proportion of innocent people would accept the plea deal.  This hypothesis was 
unquestionably confirmed with 52% of innocent people accepting the plea.  Consequently, 
the rate of innocent plea acceptance was significantly greater than the ideal rate of zero as 
confirmed by a single-sample t-test (t(70) = -8.73, d = -1.04, p < .001).  The second 
hypothesis predicted that despite the willingness of some innocent to accept the plea, guilty 
participants would still accept at a significantly higher rate.  This hypothesis was also 
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confirmed with 79% of guilty people accepting the plea deal versus the 52% acceptance rate 
for the innocent (Χ2 (1, N=142) = 12.59, p < .001).  Interestingly, although the guilty 
accepted the plea significantly more often than the innocent—the guilty were still not 
induced into plea acceptance 100% of the time (t(70) = 4.15, d = ..49, p < .001).  Thus, plea-
bargaining had nefarious effects on the innocent, and additionally failed to encapsulate all of 
the guilty.   
The diagnosticity ratio of plea acceptance was 1.52 (79% true plea acceptance/52% 
innocent plea acceptance), which is notably low.  As a reference for comparison, the original 
cheating paradigm study (Russano et al., 2005) reported the diagnosticity ratios for the 
confession rates in each of four conditions.  All four of those ratios were higher than 1.52 
(with a range of 2.02 to 7.67).  Thus, the acceptance of a plea agreement may be even less 
diagnostic of guilt than a confession.  
Although the innocent were not protected from feeling coerced into a plea agreement, 
they did report significantly lower levels of perceived likelihood of being charged with 
academic dishonesty as compared to the guilty (t(140) = -3.66, d = -.62, p < .001).  Innocent 
individuals also reported that the evidence against them seemed significantly weaker (t(140) 
= -5.71, d = -.97, p < .001) and less plausible than did guilty individuals (t(140) = -7.09, d = -
1.19, p < .001).  These differences are particularly interesting considering that the evidence 
brought forth by the experimenter against both the innocent and guilty was identical.  
Innocent individuals (as compared to guilty) also reported lower levels of fear (t(140) = -
2.31, d = -.39, p < .05), anxiety (t(140) = -2.19, d = -.37, p < .05), and relief (t(140) = -2.82, d 
= -.48, p < .01) after being told the accusation was false. 
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The participants that did accept the plea, even those that were innocent, perceived the 
possible negative consequences (of being charged with academic dishonesty through the 
Dean of Students office) as significantly more likely than those who rejected the plea (t(140) 
= 7.83, d = 1.32, p < .001).  Those who accepted the plea deal also perceived the evidence 
against them as significantly stronger (t(140) = 4.44, d = .75, p < .001) and more plausible 
(t(139) = 2.60, d = .44, p < .05) than those that rejected.  Additionally, those who accepted 
the plea reported higher levels of fear (t(140) = 6.05, d = 1.02, p < .001), anxiety (t(140) = 
4.36, d = .74, p < .001), and relief (t(140) = 4.96, d = .84, p < .001) when told the accusation 
was false than those who rejected the plea.  Refer to Table 1 for the mean and standard 
deviation values on the post-accusation measures separated by both guilt-innocence and plea 
outcome.   
Table 1.  
Mean responses (with standard deviations) on the post-manipulation questions regarding the 
cheating accusation separated by guilt-innocence and plea outcome.   
 Plea Outcome N                Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Likelihood of Consequence      
Guilty Accept 57 4.96 2.40 
Guilty Reject 14 2.07 1.27 
Innocent Accept 37 4.14 2.44 
Innocent Reject 34 1.65 .81 
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Table 1. (continued)     
 Plea Outcome N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Evidence Strength     
Guilty Accept 57 3.70 2.13 
Guilty Reject 14 2.00 1.71 
Innocent Accept 37 1.92 1.57 
Innocent Reject 34 1.32 1.07 
Evidence Plausibility     
Guilty Accept 56 3.89 1.34 
Guilty Reject 14 2.93 1.27 
Innocent Accept 37 1.97 1.17 
Innocent Reject 34 2.21 1.49 
Fear of Consequences     
        Guilty Accept 57 4.21 1.16 
        Guilty Reject 14 2.50 1.61 
        Innocent Accept 37 3.86 1.42 
        Innocent Reject 34 2.68 1.47 
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Table 1. (continued)     
 Plea Outcome N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Anxiety     
        Guilty Accept 57 3.70 1.16 
        Guilty Reject 14 2.29 1.07 
        Innocent Accept 37 3.22 1.40 
        Innocent Reject 34 2.62 1.37 
Relief     
         Guilty Accept 57 4.00 1.15 
        Guilty Reject 14 3.29 1.14 
        Innocent Accept 37 3.78 1.13 
        Innocent Reject 34 2.74 1.19 
Note. N = 142.  
 
Participants were also asked to subsequently report why they chose to reject or accept 
the plea deal.  Their responses were coded into categories and are described in Table 1.  Note 
that due to the low proportion of guilty people who rejected the plea deal, no clear 
conclusions can be made regarding their reasoning for their plea decisions.  Interestingly, 
among those who accepted the agreement, justifications did not differ much among the guilty 
and innocent—with the exception of the 16.7% contingent of guilty individuals who 
admittedly accepted because they were guilty and had done wrong.  Reasons for rejecting the 
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plea deal were also relatively similar among both the guilty and innocent.  The top factor 
driving both the innocent and guilty to reject the deal was innocence. 
Table 2. 
 
Frequency of reasons for acceptance and rejection of the plea deal among the guilty versus 
innocent participants. 
 Reasons for Acceptance  Reasons for Rejection 
 Innocent Guilty  Innocent Guilty 
Fear 21.9% (7) 31.3% (15) Innocent 61.8% (21) 42.9% (6) 
Easiest 
Alternative 37.5% (12) 
27.1% 
(13) I’ll Fight This 14.7% (5) 7.1% (1) 
Pressure 12.5% (4) 8.3% (4) No Pressure 8.8% (3) 7.1% (1) 
Conclude the 
Situation 12.5% (4) 4.2% (2) No Proof 5.9% (2) 7.1% (1) 
Miscellaneous 12.5% (4) 8.3% (4) Unfair 2.9% (1) 7.1% (1) 
Can’t Prove 
Innocence 3.1% (1) 4.2% (2) No Time 2.9% (1) 14.3% (2) 
Guilty 0.0% (0) 16.7% (8) Untrue 2.9% (1) 0.0% (0) 
   Deal Seemed Vague 0.0% (0) 14.3% (2) 
Note. N = (x). 
 
Reliability & Validity of Individual Difference Measures 
 All of the individual difference measures were subjected to a variety of reliability and 
validity tests (refer to Appendix J for descriptive statistics and reliability measures).  All the 
individual difference measures attained Cronbach’s αs > .70.  A correlation matrix examined 
all of the relationships among the individual difference predictor variables (refer to Appendix 
K) in order to further scrutinize the validity of the measures by replicating the relationships 
found in existing literature.  The Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS) significantly 
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correlated with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE) scale (r(140) = .30, p < .001), which is 
consistent with literature positing a well-being function to belief in a just world (Hafer & 
Begue, 2005).  Self-esteem was also significantly correlated with the psychological 
entitlement scale (PES; r(139)= .19, p = .02), which is in line with current views on PES as 
an extreme or exaggerated level of self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2004).  Self-esteem was also 
negatively correlated with both volatility (r(140) = -.29, p < .001) and withdrawal (r(140) = 
.59, p < .001)—the two aspects of neuroticism.  These correlations are in keeping with the 
more positive outlook consistent among those with high self-esteem.  Self-esteem also 
significantly correlated with both aspects of extraversion (enthusiasm, r(140) = .29, p < .001, 
and assertiveness, r(140) = .31, p < .001).  The PES was significantly negatively correlated 
with both aspects of agreeableness (compassion, r(139) = -.33, p < .001, and politeness, 
r(139) = -.36, p < .001) also replicating previous research (Campbell et al., 2004).   
Among the Big Five Aspects, volatile neuroticism correlated significantly with both 
the polite (r(140) = -.32, p < .001) and compassionate (r(140) = -.20, p = .02) aspects of 
agreeableness in a negative direction.  Volatile neuroticism also had a significantly negative 
correlation with conscientious industriousness (r(140) = -.29, p < .005) and intelligent 
openness (r(140) = -.22, p = .01).  Withdrawn neuroticism also had a significantly negative 
relationship with intelligent openness (r(140)= -.29, p < .001) and conscientious 
industriousness (r(140) = -.49, p < .001).  Withdrawn neuroticism was also significantly and 
negatively related with both the enthusiastic (r(140) = -.27, p < .005) and assertive (r(140) = 
-.36, p < .001) aspects of extraversion.  Compassionate agreeableness was significantly and 
positively related to extraverted enthusiasm (r(140) = .31, p < .001) and open openness 
(r(140) = .47, p < .001).  Polite agreeableness was significantly correlated with extraverted 
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assertiveness (r(140) = -.23, p < .01) in a negative direction.  Conscientious industriousness 
was significantly correlated with both the enthusiastic (r(140) = .23, p < .01) and assertive 
(r(140) = .39, p < .001) aspects of extraversion.  It was also significantly correlated with the 
intelligent aspect of openness (r(140) = .25, p < .005).  Intelligent openness was also 
significantly correlated with the assertive aspect of extraversion (r(140) = .30, p < .001).  
These correlations followed most of the trends found in previous research examining the 
relationships among the Big Five Aspects (DeYoung et al., 2007) further validating my use 
of these individual difference measures.   
Individual Differences as Moderators 
Multiple hierarchical logistic regressions tested whether the individual difference 
variables interacted with guilt-innocence to moderate the rates of plea acceptance.  Step one 
of each regression included both guilt-innocence and the theoretically relevant individual 
difference measure.  Entering both variables at step one of the analyses helped to ensure that 
any covariance of the two (by chance) would be excluded from the model.   Step two 
included the interaction variable, which was computed by multiplying guilt-innocence and 
the individual difference variables.  All of the individual difference variables were mean-
centered, and all of the dichotomous variables were dummy coded with the values 0 and 1.   
There were only two individual difference measures that interacted with guilt-
innocence to affect plea outcomes—All other individual difference measures had non-
significant interactions.  The effects of self-esteem on plea outcome were not contingent on 
guilt or innocence (β = .40, Wald = .77, p = .38).  Similarly, psychological entitlement had no 
differential effects on plea outcome between the innocent and guilty (β = -.16, Wald = .14, p 
= .71).  Strong endorsement of belief in a just world, however, affected the guilty more than 
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the innocent (β = -1.32, Wald = 4.63, p = .03).  Guilty people with strong endorsement of 
belief in a just world were less likely to reject the plea than those with low endorsement of 
belief in a just world (refer to Figure 2).  The plea outcomes of innocent people were 
unaffected by belief in a just world.  This interaction remained significant when controlling 
for other individual difference variables (β = -1.31, Wald = 4.56, p = .03).   
Figure 2.	  Significant two-way interaction between belief in a just world and guilt-innocence. 
Hierarchical logistic regressions revealed only one additional interaction of the Big 
Five Aspects with guilt-innocence on plea acceptance outcome.  Specifically, the two 
predicted interactions among the Big Five were not found with either corresponding aspect 
measure.  Neurotic volatility and neurotic withdrawal had no differential effects on plea 
outcome between the innocent and guilty regardless of whether other predictors were 
controlled (β = -.47, Wald = 1.57, p = .21; β = -.47, Wald = 1.14, p = .29, respectively).  
Similarly, agreeable compassion and agreeable politeness also failed to affect the guilty and 
innocent any differently with regard to plea outcomes (β = -.34, Wald = .39, p = .53; β = .86, 
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Wald = 2.71, p = .10, respectively).  Refer to Table 2 for additional Big Five Aspect 
interaction values. 
Table 3.  
 
Interaction values for each Big Five Aspect with guilt-innocence on plea outcomes in 
hierarchical logistic regression. 
 β               Wald p-value 
 
Neuroticism  
   
Volatility -.47 1.57 .21 
Withdrawal -.47 1.14 .29 
Agreeableness    
Compassion -.34 .39 .53 
Politeness .86 2.71 .10 
Conscientiousness    
Industriousness .86 3.18 .07 
Orderliness .60 2.18 .14 
Extraversion    
Enthusiasm -.10 .06 .81 
Assertiveness .04 .01 .92 
Openness    
Openness -.50 1.40 .24 
Intelligence -1.22 5.52 .02* 
Note. N = 142.  
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Although not predicted, innocent individuals with higher intelligence (measured as an 
aspect of openness) were generally more likely to reject the plea than innocent individuals 
lower in intelligence (β = -1.22, Wald = 5.52, p = .02; refer to Figure 3).  In other words, 
higher intelligence was related to lower plea acceptance, but only for the innocent.  Again, 
the pattern of this interaction was unaffected by controlling for other predictor variables.  
Figure 3.	  Significant two-way interaction between openness-intelligence and guilt-innocence	  
Interestingly, innocent individuals with higher ACT scores were also generally more 
likely to reject the plea than the innocent with lower ACT scores (β = -.20, Wald = 3.05, p = 
.08; refer to Figure 4).  Guilty individuals appeared generally unaffected by ACT scores.  
Although this interaction was not significant, it is worth noting because it replicates the 
pattern found with the intelligence aspect of openness.  The intelligence aspect of openness 
did have a significantly positive relationship with ACT score (r(134) = .53, p < .001).  Thus, 
it seemed important to investigate whether ACT scores produced a similar pattern to 
intelligence.  The maintenance of this general pattern with both objective and subjective 
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measures of intelligence further validates the more general conclusion that higher 
intelligence reduces the likelihood of innocent plea acceptance.  	  
Figure 4. Plea acceptance outcome as a function of ACT scores and guilt-innocence 
Individual Difference Main Effects 
Preliminary correlational analyses examined the potential relationships among plea 
acceptance outcome (which was coded dichotomously), guilt-innocence, and the predictor 
variables.  Table 3 represents the correlations among guilt-innocence, plea outcome, and the 
demographic measures.  
  
.00 
.10 
.20 
.30 
.40 
.50 
.60 
.70 
.80 
.90 
1.00 
Low ACT High ACT 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f A
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
Innocent 
Guilty 
  
	  
40 
Table 4 
 
Correlation matrix including plea outcome, guilt-innocence, and other demographic 
measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 142. **p < .001; *p < .05 
 
Plea outcome was not significantly related to belief in a just world, self-esteem, or 
psychological entitlement.  Compassion (as an aspect of agreeableness) was positively 
related to plea rejection such that higher levels of compassion related to a higher probability 
of plea rejection (r(140) = .19, p = .03).  The intelligent aspect of openness was also 
positively correlated with plea rejection such that higher intelligence indicated higher plea 
rejection rates (r(140) = .25, p < .005).  These initial correlations must be interpreted with 
caution because they cannot account for multicollinearity among all of the predictor 
variables, which means that some of these correlations could be driven by other highly 
related variables.  
Partial correlation analyses were run with all of the predictor variables and plea 
outcome to determine whether the standard correlation patterns were maintained.  Each 
partial correlation was calculated between plea outcome and the predictor variable of interest 
while controlling for all other theoretically related predictor variables.  The positive 
relationship between political spectrum and plea rejection was maintained such that extreme 
 Plea Outcome Guilt-Innocence Political Party 
Political 
Spectrum 
Guilt-
Innocence 
-.30** 
    
Political Party -.15  
-.09 
   
Political 
Spectrum 
.24* 
 
-.06 
 
-.78** 
  
ACT .25*  
-.09 
 
-.08 
 
.12 
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conservatism resulted in higher rates of plea rejection (r(135) = .23, p < .01) when 
controlling for other related predictor variables.  Stronger belief in a just world was 
negatively related to plea rejection such that those with strong belief in a just world were 
generally more likely to accept a plea (r(129) = -.20, p = .02).  This relationship was only 
revealed in the partial correlation analysis when controlling for other related predictor 
variables.  Recall as well that this relation is moderated by the interaction with guilt versus 
innocence, which indicated that the relation held only for the guilty.  Enthusiasm was also 
negatively related to plea rejection such that those higher in the enthusiastic aspect of 
extraversion were generally more likely to accept a plea (r(132) = -.21, p = .05).  
Self-esteem and psychological entitlement had no measurable effect on plea outcomes 
(β = -.66, Wald = 1.08, p = .30; β = .00, Wald = .00, p = 1.00, respectively).  These main 
effects remained non-significant even when controlling for theoretically related predictor 
variables.  The two aspects of neuroticism, volatility (β = .48, Wald = .83, p = .36) and 
withdrawal (β = .41, Wald = .45, p = .50) also had non-significant effects on plea outcomes.  
Compassionate agreeableness also had no measurable effect on plea outcomes (β = .92, Wald 
= 1.08, p = .30).  Agreeable politeness had a non-significant effect such that higher levels of 
politeness were somewhat related to higher levels of plea acceptance (β = -1.47, Wald = 3.34, 
p = .07) regardless of whether the effects of other predictor variables were controlled.  
Although higher intelligence and ACT scores were positively associated with higher levels of 
plea rejection as evidenced by significant main effects, these trends are less important in light 
of the significant interaction values (β = 2.56, Wald = 8.64, p < .005; β = .45, Wald = 5.87, p 
= .02, respectively).  Refer to Table 4 for additional Big Five Aspect main effect values. 
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Table 5.  
 
Main effect values for Big Five Aspects on plea outcomes in hierarchical logistic regression 
 β               Wald p-value 
 
Neuroticism  
   
Volatility .48 .83 .36 
Withdrawal .41 .45 .50 
Agreeableness    
Compassion .92 1.08 .30 
Politeness -1.47 3.34 .07 
Conscientiousness    
Industriousness -.97 2.01 .16 
Orderliness -.99 2.66 .10 
Extraversion    
Enthusiasm -.14 .05 .82 
Assertiveness .32 .30 .58 
Openness    
Openness .92 2.20 .14 
Intelligence 2.56 8.64 .003* 
Note. N = 142.  
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CHAPTER 4.  DISCUSSION 
 This research marks the first empirical study of plea acceptance rates in both the 
innocent and the guilty—thereby providing the first estimate of the diagnosticity of plea 
acceptance on actual guilt.  As hypothesized, the results showed that a significant contingent 
of innocent people were willing to accept a plea bargain at a high rate of 52%.  Although 
significantly more guilty people accepted the plea than innocent, the diagnosticity ratio of 
plea acceptance was still an unimpressive 1.52.  Further, while plea-bargaining coerced a 
significant proportion of innocent people into acceptance, it still failed to capture all of the 
guilty who accepted at a rate of 79%.  Given these results, the courts may be forced to re-
examine whether the efficiency of plea-bargaining is worth the weakened integrity of our 
legal system.  These results lend support to the cases of many legal scholars who have long 
proclaimed that plea-bargaining is not a tried and true method to justice, at least not in its 
current form (Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, 2009; Kipnis, 2001; Ross, 2006).   
 This research was also the first to explore what individual differences might 
predispose some people to innocent plea acceptance.  Due to the exploratory nature of this 
work, the interactions should be interpreted with caution given the number of variables 
involved and the number of tests conducted.  Generally, people who are less intelligent seem 
to be at a higher risk of accepting a plea despite their innocence.  This finding is in line with 
research on confessions, which has shown that people with lower intelligence are at a higher 
risk of making self-incriminating statements, although this finding has been limited primarily 
to the mentally retarded (Kassin, 2008).  Research examining the effects of intelligence in 
this realm has also been limited to objective measures of intelligence (e.g., IQ tests, ACT 
scores), and has not extended to subjective trait measures.  This study is the first to show that 
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the general effects of intelligence may extend from objective to subjective measures.  It is 
worthwhile to note however, that in most situations, falsely confessing to a crime provides no 
benefit to the confessor.  Plea acceptance, on the other hand, can offer several benefits if 
conviction at trial is likely.  In the current study, intelligent individuals could easily have 
reasoned that the experimenter and professor lacked the evidence necessary to successfully 
charge them with academic dishonesty.  In a different scenario, for which the assembled 
evidence was significantly greater, perhaps individuals with higher intelligence would 
actually be more likely to plea even when innocent—if they could reasonably judge the 
evidence as strong enough to convict.     
  Belief in a just world had interesting asymmetric effects on plea acceptance among 
the guilty and innocent.  As predicted, individuals with strong endorsement of belief in a just 
world were more likely to accept the plea when guilty than those with weaker endorsement 
of belief in a just world.  But the relation is not symmetric because innocent individuals with 
strong belief in a just world were no more likely to reject the plea when innocent than those 
with weak belief in a just world.  Guilty individuals who believe in a just world may have 
been more motivated to accept the plea deal due to their fear that if they did not accept 
punishment for their actions, something worse would come later.  If people get what they 
deserve, they should take the bargain offered to them as their just desserts.  Innocent 
individuals who believe in a just world pose a more complicated picture.   
Why would the relation between just world beliefs and pleas hold for the guilty but 
the converse not hold for the innocent?  First, it is important to note that all of the individuals 
in this study had something bad happen to them—they were all accused of cheating.  To 
those who ascribe to belief in a just world, this negative occurrence could have imposed a 
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threat to their endorsement of belief in a just world, especially if they were innocent.  The 
innocent who believe in a just world are then placed in an unpleasant situation.  Despite 
being a good person, something bad has happened to them.  Further, it seems plausible that 
belief in a just world as a construct is asymmetrical.  Previous research on belief in a just 
world has focused on the distinction between self versus global belief in a just world (Hafer 
& Begue, 2005), but there may be another distinction that has thus far gone unnoticed.  
People may believe that bad things happen to bad people, and not necessarily believe that 
good things happen to good people or vice versa.  Because being good is the norm, it is more 
difficult to imagine how being good can guarantee consistently good outcomes.  It is much 
easier to imagine that bad people who steal or cheat would end up in jail or lose their 
fortunes.  Further research should explore this possible asymmetry in just world beliefs.         
 Although most of the predicted individual difference moderators of plea-bargaining 
behaviors did not emerge in logistic regressions, these measures could still illustrate 
something valuable.  Namely that the power of the situation may be so strong as to overcome 
many of the behaviors that would typically be endorsed by people high in certain traits.  The 
power of self-esteem, psychological entitlement, neuroticism, and agreeableness might be 
overshadowed by the power of the situation involving an accusation and the presentation of a 
deal.  Thus, only individual differences that are engaged by their high relevancy to the 
situation meaningfully affect the outcomes of the deal.  The possibility also remains that my 
initial hypotheses were incorrect, and these traits really do not pertain to plea negotiation 
contexts of any kind.     
 This research has shown that the “innocence” problem posited by legal scholars does 
exist.  Now, research must guide policy in minimizing this problem.  Although Alaska, El 
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Paso, and Philadelphia have adopted systems that ban the practice of plea-bargaining, the 
abolition of plea negotiations is not a realistic solution on a national stage (Bar-Gill & Ben-
Shahar, 2009).  
Other, more realistic and efficient solutions to the “innocence problem” inherent in 
the current plea negotiation system have been proposed by a number of legal scholars (Gazal-
Ayal, 2006).  One such solution involves enforcing a partial ban on plea bargains.  The 
partial ban would only apply to cases in which the State had failed to accrue an ample 
amount of evidence against the defendant—these so-called “weak” cases would have to be 
resolved by trial.  Stronger cases on the other hand, could still be decided by plea 
negotiations (Gazal-Ayal, 2006).  In the current system, prosecutors can be assured 
convictions even in weak cases (in which the defendants are more likely to be innocent) by 
granting large concessions in plea negotiations.  If plea negotiations were banned in weak 
cases however, and all such cases were required to advance to trial, prosecutors would 
become more reluctant to pursue such charges (Gazal-Ayal, 2006).  Consequently, in a 
partial ban system weaker cases would be dropped thereby offering greater protections to the 
innocent (who would presumably be implicated in weak cases). 
An additional suggestion to regulating the current plea negotiation system involves 
the creation of “plea-based ceilings” (Covey, 2008).  Plea-based ceilings would refer to the 
maximum allotted punishment permitted if one rejected a plea bargain and was convicted at 
trial.  These ceilings would be adjusted upward from the penalty offered in plea negotiations 
by some pre-determined, fixed percentage (e.g., 25%).  For instance, if a defendant was 
accused of drug possession and offered only eight months of jail time in exchange for a 
guilty plea, the maximum jail sentence the defendant could face (even if convicted at trial) 
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would be ten months.  Such a system would limit the possible size of sentence differentials 
among people who committed similar crimes while maintaining a “plea discount” or “trial 
penalty”.  Ceilings would also effectively minimize current overcharging practices employed 
by prosecutors in order to aid them in bargaining procedures.   
With these policies in mind (none of which are mutually exclusive), pressures to 
improve the current plea negotiation system might rise with additional empirical results 
supporting the flaws of negotiations.   In light of survey research in the state of Washington 
that showed that 82% of respondents rejected plea-bargaining resolutions in criminal cases, 
the potential for these pressures seems even more likely (Fagan, 1981).  Additionally, 64% of 
survey respondents in Chicago also expressed negative attitudes toward plea bargains (Rich 
& Sampson, 1990).  In short, with continued research and public support the American plea 
bargaining system could be improved in both efficacy and fairness. 
On Wednesday, March 21st, 2012, the U. S. Supreme Court released a landmark 
decision regarding plea negotiations (long after data collection in the current research had 
concluded).  The Court ruled that due to the ubiquity of plea-bargaining and its growing role 
in due process, defendants have a Constitutional right to effective legal advice in the plea 
process (Lafler v. Cooper, 2012; Missiouri v. Frye, 2012).  “… the right to adequate 
assistance of counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the central role 
plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and determining sentences” (Lafler v. Cooper, 
pg. 11).  It is currently unclear whether this ruling will require defense attorneys to be present 
during plea negotiations.  Defendants have always had a right to access attorneys during the 
plea process, but many chose to waive these rights.  In light of this recent decision, even 
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defendants who have waived their right to an attorney may have those rights automatically 
reinstated during the negotiation process.   
The current research cannot be easily extrapolated to cases in which a defense 
attorney represents the defendant.  There were several practical reasons for this limitation.  
First, it would be difficult to invent an experimental protocol such that plea bargain advice 
could be offered without arousing suspicion in participants.  Second, it would be additionally 
difficult to determine how such advice should be administered in order to resemble advice 
from a defense attorney.  Defense attorneys vary greatly in personality, ability to 
communicate, and effectiveness in plea negotiations (Lynch & Evans, 2002).  Such 
variations would be difficult to replicate in a lab.  Third, as discussed earlier, people seem to 
be very willing to waive their rights, including rights to an attorney.  It is thus, logical to 
assume that a significant number of cases are resolved through plea negotiations without a 
defense attorney present—at least prior to the most recent Supreme Court decision.  Future 
litigation will have to reveal whether there is a Constitutional imperative for the presence of 
an attorney to represent the defendant.   
Interestingly, Lafler v. Cooper (2012) made no mention of the possibility that the 
innocent could be accepting plea deals.  Justice Kennedy did include an intriguing quote 
from a piece entitled, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, “’The expected post-trial 
sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases.  It is like the sticker price for cars:  only 
an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less a 
bargain’” (Lafler v. Cooper, pg. 9).  This quotation seems to imply that the only way to avoid 
being one of the few percent that receive the expected post-trial sentence is—to accept the 
plea offer.  If that is the case, why does the “full price” sentence even exist?  It would seem, 
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just like the sticker price for cars, that full, maximum sentences really exist as a motivator for 
defendants toward bargaining.     
Plea negotiations continue to define innumerable criminal outcomes.  In 1993, the 
bodies of three eight-year old boys were found mutilated in a creek in West Memphis, 
Arkansas.  The State asserted that the murders had been part of a Satanic ritual that had taken 
place in the woods near the creek where the bodies were found.  That theory was seemingly 
corroborated after a confession from 17-year old Jessie Misskelly (who had a reported I.Q. of 
72) describing the ritualistic murders in greater detail.  The confession came after 12 hours of 
interrogation in which neither a guardian or defense attorney had been present.  Several of 
the details included in the confession were also inconsistent with the facts of the crime (e.g., 
Misskelly claimed that the boys were kidnapped at noon even though they had been at 
school).  He immediately recanted and refused to testify against either Damien Echols or 
Jason Baldwin, even after explicit offers for more lenient sentences.  He was tried on his own 
and sentenced to life-plus-forty-years.   
Echols and Baldwin were tried together after Misskelly’s conviction.  The State 
presented an expert witness who described the clear analogues between the murders and 
established Satanic ritual.  Unfortunately, this expert was completely discredited when the 
defense revealed that he had taken absolutely no classes to earn either his Masters or Ph.D. 
degree.  Additionally, an expert pathologist testified that the alleged murder procedure was 
very improbable given the nature of the wounds.  He stated that even he would lack the skill 
to complete those types of mutilations at night and in the water.  The bodies also lacked any 
mosquito bites, which is quite unusual if the murders had actually taken place in the woods.  
The alleged crime scene also lacked any signs of blood or other DNA signatures.  
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Furthermore, in line with Misskelley’s confession, the Defense pointed out the impossibility 
that Baldwin (who was smaller in size and stature) could have possibly carried the struggling 
boys to the creek.  The State did manage to provide two other teenage witnesses who each 
claimed to have overheard Damien confessing to the crime.  Jason Baldwin was sentenced to 
life in prison and Damien Echols was sentenced to death by lethal injection.  After their 
convictions, Misskelley, Baldwin, and Echols inspired a growing movement calling for their 
release—Release the West Memphis Three.   
On August 19th, 2011, after eighteen years of incarceration, the three boys reached an 
agreement with prosecutors entering Alford pleas.  They continued to assert their own 
innocence while acknowledging that prosecutors possess enough evidence to convict them.  
They were sentenced to time served and released shortly thereafter.  Due to their plea 
acceptance, they will be unable to sue the State for damages or compensation for years spent 
in prison.  Pleas such as these provide the State with the power to secure convictions while 
avoiding litigation against individuals who reject their guilt.  Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin, 
Jessie Misskelley, and Charles E. Harris, Sr. have all been coerced into plea agreements that 
cost them years in prison.   
How can future individuals like Echols, Baldwin, Misskelley, and Harris be spared 
the injustices of the plea system?  Further litigation may spare a few defendants as the “… 
whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure:  plea-bargaining law” is further 
defined (Lafler v. Cooper, p. 1 of dissent).  Nonetheless, only research can ultimately reveal 
what policies can protect the innocent from plea acceptance.  This research was the first to 
experimentally demonstrate that the theoretical “innocence problem” posited by legal 
scholars truly exists.  Further research will now have to demonstrate how this problem can be 
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minimized.  Importantly, future research should focus on the exploration of system variables 
that can be controlled by the criminal justice system (Wells, 1978).  The most important 
system variable currently seems to be the excessive cost of rejecting a deal and advancing to 
trial—the plea threat.  A follow-up study is currently exploring whether manipulating the 
severity of the plea threat will affect plea acceptance outcomes—especially among the 
innocent.  Experimentally examining these system variables is the only way that we can 
substantiate potential reforms to protect the innocent.    
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Appendix A 
Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS) 
Below are several statements about beliefs you may or may not have.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of 
agreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.  __________ 
 
2. I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded.  __________ 
 
3. I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.  __________ 
 
4. I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves.  
__________ 
 
5. I feel that people get what they deserve.  __________ 
 
6. I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given.  __________ 
 
 
7. I basically feel that the world is a fair place.  __________ 
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Appendix B 
 
Rosenberg Self Esteem (RSE) Scale 
Below are several statements about how you feel about yourself.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of 
agreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.  __________ 
 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.  __________ 
 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.  __________ 
 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.  __________ 
 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.  __________ 
 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.  __________ 
 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.  __________ 
 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.  __________ 
 
9. I certainly feel useless at times.  __________ 
 
10. At times I think I am no good at all.  __________ 
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Appendix C 
 
Psychological Entitlement Scale (PES) 
Below are several statements about how you feel about yourself.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of 
agreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others.  __________ 
 
2. Great things should come to me.  __________ 
 
3. If I were on the Titantic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat! __________ 
 
4. I demand the best because I’m worth it.  __________ 
 
5. I do not necessarily deserve special treatment.  __________ 
 
6. I deserve more things in life.  __________ 
 
7. People like me deserve an extra break now and then.  __________ 
 
8. Things should go my way.  __________ 
 
9. I feel entitled to more of everything.  __________ 
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5 
Appendix D 
 
Initial Demographic Questionnaire 
 
1. Gender (check one) FEMALE_____ MALE_____ 
2. What is your age?   _______________ 
3. Are you a U.S.  Citizen? YES  NO 
4. What is your racial/ethnic background?  (circle one) 
 
 White    Black    Asian 
 Hispanic   Other ____________ 
5.   Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or 
an Independent? 
 
1 
STRONG 
REPUBLICAN 
2 
NOT VERY 
STRONG 
REPUBLICAN 
3 
INDEPENDENT 
LEANING 
REPUBLICAN 
4 
INDEPENDENT 
5 
INDEPENDENT 
LEANING 
DEMOCRAT 
6 
NOT VERY 
STRONG 
DEMOCRAT 
7 
DEMOCRAT 
6. Which of these opinions best represents your views? 
  
1 
EXTREMELY 
LIBERAL 
2 
LIBERAL 
3 
SLIGHTLY 
LIBERAL 
4 
MODERATE/
MIDDLE OF 
THE ROAD 
5 
SLIGHTLY 
CONSERVATIVE 
6 
CONSERVATIVE 
7 
EXTREMELY 
CONSERVATIVE 
7. What was your ACT composite score (estimate if necessary) ___________.  If you 
took this test more than once, report your highest score.  If you did not take the ACT, 
mark this box: 
 
8. Compared to others, how high was your ACT composite score?  If you took this test 
more than once, respond with respect to your highest score.  If you did not take the 
ACT, mark this box: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
MUCH LOWER 
THAN 
AVERAGE 
LOWER THAN 
AVERAGE 
AVERAGE HIGHER THAN 
AVERAGE 
MUCH HIGHER 
THAN 
AVERAGE 
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Appendix E 
 
Big Five-Aspect Scale (BFAS) 
Below are several statements about what you think about yourself.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you think each statement 
describes you by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Neuroticism 
1. I get angry easily.  __________ 
2. I get upset easily.  __________ 
3. I change my mood a lot.  __________ 
4. I am a person whose moods go up and down easily.  __________ 
5. I get easily agitated.  __________ 
6. I can be stirred up easily.  __________ 
7. I rarely get irritated.  __________ 
8. I keep my emotions under control.  __________ 
9. I rarely lose my composure.  __________ 
10.   I am not easily annoyed.  __________ 
11.   I am filled with doubts about things.  __________ 
 
12.   I feel threatened easily.  __________ 
 
13.   I worry about things.  __________ 
 
14.   I am easily discouraged.  __________ 
 
15.   I become overwhelmed by events.  __________ 
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16.   I am afraid of many things.  __________ 
 
17.   I seldom feel blue.  __________ 
 
18.   I feel comfortable with myself.  __________ 
 
19.   I rarely feel depressed.  __________ 
 
20.   I am not embarrassed easily.  __________ 
 
Agreeableness 
 
21.   I feel others’ emotions.  __________ 
 
22.   I inquire about others’ well being.  __________ 
 
23.   I sympathize with others’ feelings.  __________ 
 
24.   I take an interest in other people’s lives.  __________ 
 
25.   I like to do things for others.  __________ 
 
26.   I am not interested in other people’s problems.  __________ 
 
27.   I can’t be bothered with other’s needs.  __________ 
 
28.   I am indifferent to the feelings of others.  __________ 
 
29.   I take no time for others.  __________ 
 
30.   I don’t have a soft side.  __________ 
 
31.   I respect authority.  __________ 
 
32.   I hate to seem pushy.  __________ 
 
33.   I avoid imposing my will on others.  __________ 
 
34.   I rarely put people under pressure.  __________ 
 
35.   I insult people.  __________ 
 
36.   I believe that I am better than others.  __________ 
 
37.   I take advantage of others.  __________ 
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38.   I seek conflict.  __________ 
 
39.   I love a good fight.  __________ 
 
40.   I am out for my own personal gain.  __________ 
 
Conscientiousness 
 
41.   I carry out my plans.  __________ 
 
42.   I finish what I start.  __________ 
 
43.   I get things done quickly.  __________ 
 
44.   I always know what I am doing.  __________ 
 
45.   I waste my time.  __________ 
 
46.   I find it difficult to get down to work.  __________ 
 
47.   I mess things up.  __________ 
 
48.   I don’t put my mind on the task at hand.  __________ 
 
49.   I postpone decisions.  __________ 
 
50.   I am easily distracted.  __________ 
 
51.   I like order.  __________ 
 
52.   I keep things tidy.  __________ 
 
53.   I follow a schedule.  __________ 
 
54.   I want everything to be “just right” .  __________ 
 
55.   I see that rules are observed.  __________ 
 
56.   I want every detail taken care of.  __________ 
 
57.   I leave my belongings around.  __________ 
 
58.   I am not bothered by messy people.  __________ 
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59.   I am not bothered by disorder.  __________ 
 
60.   I dislike routine.  __________ 
 
Extraversion 
 
61.   I make friends easily.  __________ 
 
62.   I warm up quickly to others.  __________ 
 
63.   I show my feelings when I’m happy.  __________ 
 
64.   I have a lot of fun.  __________. 
 
65.   I laugh a lot.  __________ 
 
66.   I am hard to get to know.  __________ 
 
67.   I keep others at a distance.  __________ 
 
68.   I reveal little about myself.  __________ 
 
69.   I rarely get caught up in the excitement.  __________ 
 
70.   I am not a very enthusiastic person.  __________ 
 
71.   I take charge.  __________ 
 
72.   I have a strong personality.  __________ 
 
73.   I know how to captivate people.  __________ 
   
74.   I see myself as a good leader.  __________. 
 
75.   I can talk others into doing things.  __________ 
 
76.   I am the first to act.  __________ 
 
77.   I do not have an assertive personality.  __________ 
 
78.   I lack the talent for influencing people.  __________ 
 
79.   I wait for others to lead the way.  __________ 
 
80.   I hold back my opinions.  __________ 
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Openness 
 
81.   I am quick to understand things.  __________ 
 
82.   I can handle a lot of information.  __________ 
 
83.   I like to solve complex problems.  __________ 
 
84.   I have a rich vocabulary.  __________ 
 
85.   I think quickly.  __________ 
 
86.   I formulate ideas clearly.  __________ 
 
87.   I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.  __________ 
 
88.   I avoid philosophical discussions.  __________ 
 
89.   I avoid difficult reading material.  __________ 
 
90.   I learn things slowly.  __________ 
 
91.   I enjoy the beauty of nature.  __________ 
 
92.   I believe in the importance of art.  __________ 
 
93.   I love to reflect on things.  __________ 
 
94.   I get deeply immersed in music.  __________ 
 
95.   I see beauty in things that others might not notice.  __________ 
 
96.   I need a creative outlet.  __________ 
 
97.   I do not like poetry.  __________ 
 
98.   I seldom get lost in thought.  __________ 
 
99.   I seldom daydream.  __________ 
 
100.   I seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures.  __________ 
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Appendix F 
 
 
Individual Problem # 1 
Suppose you are a bus driver.  On the first stop you pick up 6 men and 2 women.  At 
the second stop 2 men leave and 1 woman boards the bus.  At the third stop 1 man 
leaves and 2 women enter the bus.  At the fourth stop 3 men get on and 3 women 
get off.  At the fifth stop, 2 men get off, 3 men get on, 1 woman gets off, and 2 
women get on.  How many men are left on the bus, how many women are left on the 
bus, and what is the bus driver’s name? 
 
How many men are left on the bus?  _____________ 
 
How many women are left on the bus?  _____________ 
 
What is the bus driver’s name?  ________________ 
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Individual Problem #2 
 
 
 
How many triangles can you find in the figure above?  Look carefully – there are 
more than 16! 
 
 
Answer:  _____________ 
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Appendix G 
Team Problem #1 
Starting with the word “COOL”, change one letter at a time until you have the word 
“HEAT”.  Each change must result in a proper word, and you can use any letters 
in the alphabet.  Keeping in mind that you can only change one letter per step, what 
is the minimum number of steps required to achieve this change?  What are the 
steps? 
 
 
 
 
 
Answer (Give Steps, i.e., the 
words):_____________________________________________________________
___ 
____________________________________________________________ 
        
________________________________________________________  
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Team Problem # 2 
 
Right now Bethany is 12.  You can find her older brother's age by switching the digits 
in Bethany's age.  They'll be able to switch the digits in their ages again sometime in 
the future.  How old will Bethany and her brother be when this happens?  
 
 
 
 
How old will Bethany be?  ___________ 
 
How old will Bethany’s brother be?  __________ 
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Appendix H 
 
1. Please rate your partner (the other participant) on the following characteristics:  
 
 
2. What did you like best about your partner?        
             
             
 
3. What did you like least about your partner?        
             
             
 
4. If presented with additional logic problems, would you prefer to continue working with the 
same partner or be assigned to a different partner? Please respond on the following scale:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 friendly 
quiet 1 2 3 4 5 talkative 
dependent 1 2 3 4 5 independent 
unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 intelligent 
needy 1 2 3 4 5 self-reliant 
unlikeable 1 2 3 4 5 likeable 
followed directions 
poorly 
1 2 3 4 5 followed directions well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strong 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Moderate 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Slight 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Slight 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
Moderate 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
Strong 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
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Please read each below statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much 
you agree or disagree with each statement by writing down the number that 
corresponds to your level of agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. My partner (the other participant) was competent.  __________ 
 
2. My partner was aggressive towards me.  __________ 
 
3. My partner was honest.  __________ 
 
4. My partner was friendly.  __________ 
 
 
5. The experimenter was competent.  __________ 
 
6. The experimenter was aggressive towards me.  __________ 
 
7. The experimenter showed humanity towards me.  __________ 
 
8. The experimenter was honest.  __________ 
 
Use the scale below to indicate how much you experienced the emotions listed below by 
writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I didn’t feel 
like this at all 
I felt like this 
a little 
  I felt like this 
a while  
I felt like this 
a lot 
18.  Guilty  __________ 
19.  Anxious  __________ 
20.  Stressed  __________ 
21.  Pressured  __________ 
22.  Defensive  __________ 
23.  Cheated  __________ 
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24.  Angry  __________ 
25.  Insulted  __________ 
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Appendix I 
 
1)  Notes (if participant says anything of interest in response to the first few verbal 
questions): 
 
 
 
2)  How willing were you to accept the agreement offered to you? 
A. Not at all willing 
B. A little willing 
C. Somewhat willing 
D. Pretty willing 
E. Very willing 
F. Totally willing 
 
3)  Did you feel the evidence against you regarding the cheating accusation was strong? 
A. Very strong 
B. Somewhat strong 
C. Slightly strong 
D. Neutral 
E. Slightly weak 
F. Somewhat weak 
G. Very weak 
 
4)  Did you feel the evidence against you regarding the cheating accusation was 
plausible? 
A. Very plausible 
B. Somewhat plausible 
C. Slightly plausible 
D. Neutral 
E. Not at all plausible 
 
5)  Did you feel trapped into accepting the agreement? 
 
A. Totally trapped 
B. Somewhat trapped 
C. Slightly trapped 
D. Neutral 
E. Not at all trapped 
 
6)  Were you frightened by the possibility of being charged with academic dishonesty? 
A. Very frightened 
B. Somewhat frightened 
C. Slightly frightened 
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D. Neutral 
E. Not at all frightened 
 
7)  Why were you (or were you not) frightened? 
          
  
 
          
  
 
8)  How anxious were you when I accused you of cheating on the triangle problem?   
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
anxious 
Slightly anxious Neutral Somewhat 
anxious 
Totally anxious 
 
 
9)   For participants who AGREED to sign the statement: Why did you agree to sign the 
statement?  
          
  
 
          
  
 
10)   For participants who AGREED to sign the statement:  Given the evidence in the current 
situation, if you hadn’t signed the statement—How likely is it that you would have been 
charged with academic dishonesty by the Dean of Students Office?  I’d like you to respond 
on a 10-point scale from 1 being extremely unlikely to 10 being extremely likely.    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
        Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
9)   For participants who REFUSED to sign the statement: Why did you refuse to sign the 
statement?  
          
  
 
          
  
 
10)   For participants who REFUSED to sign the statement:  Given the evidence in the 
current situation—How likely is it that you will be charged with academic dishonesty by the 
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Dean of Students Office?  I’d like you to respond on a 10-point scale from 1 being extremely 
unlikely to 10 being extremely likely.    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
        Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
 
11)  I’d also like to know much pressure you felt to sign the statement? I’d like you to 
respond on a 10-point scale from 1 being no pressure at all to 10 being as much pressure as 
you could imagine.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No 
pressure  
        Most 
pressure 
imaginable 
 
12)  Do you have any questions about the experiment?  Can you tell me in your own words, 
what we’re looking at in this experiment? 
  
13)  Thinking back, which of the following statements best reflects what you were thinking at 
the time that I accused you of cheating?  
a. I totally believed everything that you said. 
b. The whole situation seemed very believable to me. 
c. I thought to myself “This might be serious”. 
d. I thought to myself “I may be in trouble here”. 
e. I didn’t know what to think. 
f. I wasn’t sure what was going on. 
g. I really didn’t think anything one way or the other, I just reacted. 
h. I wasn’t sure whether it was staged or real. 
  Follow-up: At what point did you begin to wonder?      
i. I thought that it was probably an act, but wasn’t sure.  
  Follow-up: At what point did you begin to think that?      
j. I absolutely knew it was staged. 
  Follow-up: At what point did you become absolutely sure?     
 
FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO AGREED THE PLEA NEGOTIATION: 
14)  Thinking back, which of the following statements best explains why you signed the 
statement. 
1. I thought I would get in less trouble if I agreed to it. 
2. I thought that if I signed the statement, I might be able to end to the whole 
thing.  
3. I was afraid of what might happen if I didn’t agree to it. 
4. I didn’t think it mattered whether I agreed to it or not, so I chose to sign it. 
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FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO REFUSED THE PLEA NEGOTIATION: 
14)  Thinking back, which of the following statements best explains why you refused to sign 
the statement. 
1. I thought I would get in more trouble if I agreed to it. 
2. I thought that if I refused the agreement, I could convince the experimenter 
that I was innocent. 
3. I was afraid of what might happen if I agreed to it. 
4. I didn’t think it mattered whether I agreed to it or not, so I chose not to sign it.  
 
 
 
15)  How relieved were you when I told you that the whole thing was staged and you weren’t 
in any trouble at all? 
1. not at all relieved 
2. a little relieved 
3. moderately relieved 
4. quite relieved 
5. extremely relieved 
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Appendix J 
Descriptive statistics and reliability measures for the individual difference variable indices 
 
Range 
Low                High 
Mean (SD) Cronbach’s α 
Belief in a Just World 1.43 5.43 3.60 (.71) .78 
Self-Esteem 1.60 7.00 5.71 (.91) .88 
Psychological Entitlement 1.00 5.56 3.06 (.90) .82 
Neuroticism      
Volatility 1.00 5.90 3.43 (1.07) .90 
Withdrawal 1.20 6.50 3.42 (.95) .82 
Agreeableness     
Compassion 3.40 7.00 5.67 (.75) .86 
Politeness 3.30 6.80 5.31 (.78) .75 
Conscientiousness     
Industriousness 2.50 6.60 4.54 (.85) .83 
Orderliness 1.60 6.70 4.78 (.98) .84 
Extraversion     
Enthusiasm 2.50 7.00 5.43 (.92) .88 
Assertiveness 1.80 7.00 4.75 (1.05) .91 
Openness     
Openness 3.10 7.00 5.21 (.95) .83 
Intelligence 2.60 7.00 4.74 (.87) .82 
Note.  N = 142.  All items for which strong agreement would imply lower endorsement of the relevant trait were 
reverse-coded.  The measures were then averaged and aggregated into indices.  All items were measured on 7-
point scales except belief in a just world, which was measured on a 6-point scale.   
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Appendix K 
 
 
